The Lusitania's Last Voyage: Being a narrative of the torpedoing and sinking of the R. M. S. Lusitania by a German submarine off the Irish coast, May 7, 1915Lauriat, Charles Emelius, Jr.
History
The Lusitania's Last Voyage: Being a narrative of the torpedoing and sinking of the R. M. S. Lusitania by a German submarine off the Irish coast, May 7, 1915
Lauriat, Charles Emelius, Jr.
Lusitania (Steamship)
The following testimony, for example, was informally offered: that the
portholes were open, that the discipline of the officers and crew was
not what it should have been, that the collapsible boats were not fitted
with oars and were not in proper working condition, etc. None of this
evidence seems to have been desired by his Lordship and his Assessors,
or at least there is nothing to show that it was ever laid before them.
I do not question the sincerity of the findings of Lord Mersey’s Court,
based on the evidence placed before it; but what became of this informal
evidence, as quoted above, and much more that was laid before the
Solicitor of the Board of Trade?
The Court finds that “_the portholes were closed_.” On what and on whose
evidence? The above statement can hardly be made on the evidence of the
Captain; for when he testified before the Coroner of Kinsale, in reply
to the question, “What precautions did you take in connection with these
threats?” (referring to the Notice from the German Imperial Embassy
which appeared in the New York papers of May 1), he stated that “I had
all the boats swung out and the bulkhead doors closed when we came
within the danger zone.” (“The Daily Telegraph,” May 11.)
The Captain had the lifeboats swung out Thursday morning, twenty-four
hours before the disaster, but I know of no evidence that shows that he
ever ordered the portholes closed. If he had, it is fair to presume he
would have mentioned it when he testified that he had ordered the
bulkhead doors closed.
There is evidence that at least two lifeboats, each containing about
fifty people, were dropped when almost 20 feet from the water. A
survivor of one of these boats told me that the man for’ard, who had
charge of the rope, simply let it run out through his hands. He was not
one of the “frightened passengers” but one of the crew. It seems to me
quite possible in this instance “to impute negligence” and “incompetence
in connection with them” (the ropes).
In another part of the report Lord Mersey states that “no doubt there
were mishaps in handling the ropes of the boats and in other such
matters, but there was, in my opinion, no incompetence or neglect, and I
am satisfied that the crew behaved well throughout, and worked with
skill and judgment.” Just above this in the report one reads: “That,
since the commencement of the war, the Cunard Company has lost all its
Royal Reserve and Fleet Reserve men, and the managers have had to take
on the best men they could get and to train them as well as might be in
the time at their disposal.” Is it likely that any officer could take
untrained men and in a few weeks, or even months, make such efficient
seamen of them that they could, in a disaster of this magnitude, work
“with skill and judgment”?
I do not believe it could be done.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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