The Lyon in Mourning, Vol. 1: or a collection of speeches, letters, journals, etc. relative to the affairs of Prince Charles Edward StuartForbes, Robert
History
The Lyon in Mourning, Vol. 1: or a collection of speeches, letters, journals, etc. relative to the affairs of Prince Charles Edward Stuart
Forbes, Robert
Charles Edward, Prince, grandson of James II, King of England, 1720-1788; Jacobite Rebellion, 1745-1746 -- Sources
On the other hand the Prince was vastly bent for the night-attack,
[Sidenote: _fol._ 432.] and said he had men enow to beat the enemy,
whom he believed utterly dispirited, and would never stand a bold
and brisk attack. The Duke of Perth, Lord John Drummond, with
others, seemed to wish it; and Lord George Murray, Lochgary, with
many others, were induced to make a fair trial what could be done,
though they were very sensible of the danger should it miscary.
They observed with much concern the want of provisions. The men had
only got that day a biscuit each, and some not even that.[193] It
was feared it would prove worse next day, except they could take
provisions from the enemy; and they had reason to believe if the
men were allowed to disperse to shift for some meat (which many of
them would do if the army continued there all night), that it would
be very difficult to assemble them in the event of a sudden alarm,
which, considering the nearness of the enemy, might very reasonably
be supposed; and as they must have layen that night in the muirs near
Culloden, as they had done the night before, they knew many of them
would disperse [Sidenote: _fol._ 433.] without liberty to several
miles distance for provisions and quarters, and that it would be far
in the day before they could be assembled again; and as Keppoch came
up and joined the army that afternoon, they flattered themselves that
the men they had might do if they could have made the attack by one
or two in the morning, especially if they were undiscovered, as they
had great hopes they might. For having examined the different roads,
of which they had perfect intelligence from the MacIntoshes, who
lived in those very parts, they found they could keep upon a muir the
whole way so as to shun the houses, and be a considerable way from
the highroad that leads from Inverness to Nairn. They also considered
that in the event of making the attack, should they even be beat off
without the desired success, they might before daybreak get back the
length of Culcarick,[194] which was very strong ground, and from
thence by a hill they could retire the whole way on the south side
of the water of Nairn, till they were joined by their friends whom
[Sidenote: _fol._ 434.] they expected and by the stragglers. Nor did
they believe the enemy would follow them (suppose the Highlanders
were beat back) till it were good daylight, so as they could see
about them and send out reconnoitering parties to prevent their
falling into ambuscades and snares. And before all this could be
done, the Highland army might have reached Culcarick,[195] and the
hilly ground on the south side of the water above-mentioned, where
regular troops could not easily overtake them, and where their canon
and horse (in which their greatest superiority consisted) would have
been of little use. That they found the Prince was resolved to fight
the enemy without waiting for the succours that were soon expected,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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