After the revolution of June, 1917, General Danglis was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army. He was a good soldier, but rather old; when the bulk of the troops had been transferred to Macedonia he moved his own G.H.Q. from Athens to Salonica. Later on he was relieved of his Command, and succeeded by General Paraskevopoulo. But the Greek Chief Command never really operated, save as an administrative and disciplinary organ, because there never was a real Greek Army. There were divisions and even corps, but the effective Army Command was always French or British. The lines of communication, the commissariat, the _intendance_ only existed in embryo. The mobilization had never been general from fear of provoking insurrections, and had to be effected gradually and partially; only the youngest classes were called to the colours, so that there was a lack of men for the rear services. The Greeks, like other Oriental peoples, were lacking in the sense of organization, and even as collaborators they were the despair of the British Q service which had to supply them. The Greek officers recognized it themselves openly, and said that everything with which the British undertook to supply them arrived regularly, whereas the supplies for which the Greek _intendance_ was responsible arrived with considerable delay or remained on the road. Another difficulty was the inveterate habit of the Greek soldier of selling his kit to civilians. The temptation was considerable, as the prices paid for these articles were very high, and there was a regular secret organization for such purchases, besides private transactions between friends or relations. The result was that certain units had to be re-equipped two or three times before they had marched a kilometre. The same thing happened at Salonica even among other Allied armies, but to a much smaller extent, and such cases were always severely punished at once. But with all their faults we must not forget that the Greeks did give a useful contribution to the Macedonian campaign. As we shall see later, the units that had occasion to fight behaved well, and the great sobriety and endurance of the men proved valuable assets in country as difficult and as poor in resources as Macedonia. If their losses in the war were trifling in comparison with those of the other Allies, and even as a percentage of the total numbers engaged, their utility lay in having, to some extent, solved the crisis of effectives from which the Armée d’Orient was suffering so grievously and which, in view of the reluctance of Great Powers to send reinforcements to Macedonia, had seemed well nigh insoluble. By entrusting to the Greeks, as was done in the summer of 1918, the whole of the Struma front, which, although it was not one of the very difficult sectors, required, nevertheless, a considerable number of troops to hold on account of its extension, the concentration of British troops elsewhere was rendered possible.