As we have seen, the Allies in Macedonia, at the beginning of 1917, were not in a position to attempt an offensive on a large scale. On the other hand, even the enemy did not seem to be very anxious to attack. In Roumania, Germany and Austria had lost many men, and all their available reinforcements, in spite of the progressive weakening of Russia, were absorbed on the French or Italian fronts. The Bulgarians might perhaps have done more, but they were not enthusiastic over the idea of throwing themselves headlong into an offensive, the result of which might have been the conquest of Salonica, while they knew that that city was reserved for Austria and not for them. Consequently, except for the town of Monastir, for which they had a special sentiment, all the territorial aims to which they might reasonably aspire were in their own hands, so that they had no strong inducement to face fresh risks. These are the reasons why the enemy did not then attempt a great offensive in the Mackensen style, when the Allies were weak and divided, and when their Governments refused to send large reinforcements to the East. This does not mean that they remained passive. In February they attempted operations which might have had dangerous results for the whole of the Armée d’Orient, if it had not been held up by the gallant defence of the 35th Division. [Illustration: CAMP NEAR THE PARALOVO MONASTERY.] [Illustration: HEADQUARTERS OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT ON HILL 1050. To face p. 122. ]