The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
We have endeavoured to present, without entering into the technical
details which are being taught by the officers composing the various
Allied missions, a general sketch of the conditions and principal
factors of modern warfare that will be sufficient to give an idea of a
modern army and its operation in the field.
It is hoped that our explanations will aid in reading between the lines
of the “communiqués,” in comprehending the plan and the importance of
individual engagements and finally in enabling those who have relatives
at the Front to follow them at their posts of duty and to fully realize
the importance of the parts assigned to them.
Before concluding, we should like to be granted the privilege of
expressing our personal opinion concerning the methods calculated to
hasten the instruction of the new armies of the United States.
Everyone agrees on the necessity of proceeding rapidly and effectively.
The defection of Russia on the Eastern Front and the recent very
serious reverses of the Italians, of which the Germans have not failed
to take prompt advantage, have rendered more difficult the efforts of
the Allied Armies on the Western Front.
The instruction of the American units can be terminated in France,
first in camps and afterwards in quiet sectors, until the American High
Command considers that the moment has come to throw its forces into the
thick of the fight.
Notwithstanding the immense resources of the United States, the
difficulties of transportation will doubtless be such as to force the
military authorities to hold a certain number of divisions in the
instruction camps in America.
The instruction of these troops ought, we think, to be as thorough as
possible.
The Allied countries have delegated to the United States distinguished
officers who have participated in the war and who know all its
difficulties. We should wish them to proceed, if only on a short front,
with an exact reproduction of the shell-torn fields over which the
American troops are destined to manœuvre in Europe. The small units
that could be successively and frequently trained on these prepared
fields would thereby have less time to spend in the instruction camps
in France and could more promptly be sent to the Front.
In the vast territories of the United States, ground adapted to this
purpose would not be difficult to find, and the plan would afford
opportunity to give the last divisions to embark complete instruction
in all matters of detail, and a perfect knowledge of all the component
elements of an army, from those of a company to those of a division.
Let us insist on the fact that, in this war, the art of rapid
excavation and intrenchment is one of the chief things to be learnt by
the troops, as special formations cannot be detailed for this work, and
every soldier has to carry an intrenching tool and must know how to use
it.
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