Upon this we remark that the above is based upon "the first instructions which he sends after the unforeseen event of Munich;" that that event destroyed a great system, and created what Frederick described as "a terrible crisis"; and that it was just because d'Argenson realised, with a statesman's breadth of view, the appalling consequences either at home or abroad, that he hesitated to take his choice of disasters. When grave issues are so nicely balanced, precipitation is a sign, not of strength, but of weakness. Frederick, it is true, did not hesitate; and M. de Broglie aptly supplies the reason. A man does not hesitate about the next move when he has no alternative but to throw up the game (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 219, &c., _cf._ Zevort, pp. 137, 138).] [Footnote 296: On the evidence of a certain note, M. de Broglie suggests ("Marie Thérèse," I. p. 213) that d'Argenson was by no means at one with the Council, and that he accepted with reluctance a policy which was forced upon him. The note may be read with equanimity, for it only marks the reappearance of an ideal regret, to be met with occasionally in d'Argenson's Journal--a regret for the policy of merely indirect interference which he sometimes mentions in connection with "un habile homme tel que M. Chauvelin." His true feeling with regard to the crisis is conveyed by some important words in the note immediately preceding: "Il en arrivera ce qui pourra, bien, j'espère; _mais pour la paix et un armistice dans le statu quo, il n'y faut plus penser_" (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse." I. p. 211). It is admitted that d'Argenson was not the prime mover in the policy of the Council; he looked upon that policy as little short of desperate; but he accepted it as a choice between two evil alternatives; and, as we shall find, he did everything mortal man could do to make it a success.] [Footnote 297: Zevort, Appendix, p. 351.] [Footnote 298: Ibid., pp. 138, 139.] [Footnote 299: Valori, "Mémoires," I. p. 207. "Il me semble que le parti que le roi de Pologne avait à prendre pour sa gloire, sa grandeur, son interêt et celui de sa maison, était en premier lieu de se prêter aux desseins que les rois de France et de Prusse avaient de l'élever à la dignité impériale," &c.] [Footnote 300: Zevort, p. 140.] [Footnote 301: That this was d'Argenson's real attitude is suggested by a multitude of minute hints to be found in nearly all the available documents. It is the only attitude consistent with his known opinions and with his subsequent conduct.] [Footnote 302: Zevort, p. 139.] [Footnote 303: Ibid, p. 140.] [Footnote 304: Had Frederick imagined for a moment that Valori's mission had the slightest prospect of success, his action as regards both France and Saxony might have changed in a very startling fashion. Every principle of policy would have engaged him to withstand the elevation of Augustus to the Empire.] [Footnote 305: De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 228.]