The massacre of St. Bartholomew : $b Preceded by a history of the religious wars in the reign of Charles IXWhite, Henry
History
The massacre of St. Bartholomew : $b Preceded by a history of the religious wars in the reign of Charles IX
White, Henry
France -- History -- Wars of the Huguenots, 1562-1598; Saint Bartholomew's Day, Massacre of, France, 1572
Lorraine argued that, to permit the Reformed to have their temples and
the right of public worship was to approve of their “idolatry,” which
the king could not do without the risk of eternal damnation.[143]
He denied the loyalty of the petitioners, “who are obedient only on
condition that the king should be of their opinion and their sect, or
at least approves of it.” He gloried in the animosity of the Huguenots,
adding (as if aside) “there are twenty-two of their libels against me
now on my table, and I intend to preserve them very carefully.” In
conclusion he called for the severest measures against such “of the
religion” as should take up arms; but as for those who went unarmed to
the sermon, sang psalms, and kept away from mass, he did not advise
their punishment, seeing that all severity hitherto had been useless.
He even expressed regret that they should have been so cruelly treated,
and offered his life if that could bring the stray sheep back to the
fold. He ended with an exhortation to the clergy to reform themselves,
and desired that the bishops and others should inquire into the abuses
of the Church and report thereon to the king. Of good words and good
resolutions the cardinal always had an ample store upon which he could
draw at will. They were mere counters with which to play the game of
politics.
The discussion, which also embraced the subject of the tumult of
Amboise, the severity of the retaliation, and the alarming increase of
the royal body-guard (which was denounced in nearly the same terms as
our ancestors complained of a standing army), resulted in a decision
to convene, first, the States-General, and, afterward, a national
council, to decide upon the religious faith of the French people. The
King of Spain remonstrated through his embassador against the meeting
of the States, on the ground that it would “puff up the Huguenots;”
and offered his aid to chastise them. But money was wanted, and the
court was prepared to make any temporary sacrifice in order to procure
supplies. The Venetian embassador saw the importance of this official
recognition of the Reformed party. “Either their desires will be
satisfied,” he says, “or else, if any attempt is made to keep them
obedient to the pope, the court must resort to force, shed pitilessly
the blood of the nobility, divide the kingdom into two parties, and
come to a civil war, which will destroy both country and religion....
Religious changes always lead the way to political changes;”[144]
an assertion which is only partially true. Political and religious
changes, when national and not merely personal, are produced by the
operation of similar causes; and which change shall come first depends
upon circumstances that appear to vary in every case. In 1560 the
Venetian embassador certainly had not sufficient data from which to
draw so sweeping a conclusion. The court saw no danger in the proposed
assemblies, and writs were issued for the States-General to meet in
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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