“Finally, it may be asked, has then moral philosophy no practical value? I think its prime value is purely speculative,--the supreme interest of the topic for thoughtful minds and its importance for metaphysics. But, like everything else, it has its effects. I think it is, when studied in its purity, an unrivalled mental training. I believe that the more (apart from casuistry) we reflect on the nature of the moral law the more we are likely to reverence it. And lastly I think that nearly every human being does and must to some extent philosophize. We are all apt to form crude principles, as that morality consists in keeping the law, or obeying the ten commandments, or realizing our selves, or seeking the common good. And then we are apt pendantically and priggishly to distort our genuine moral judgments in accordance with these inadequate generalizations. Moral philosophy criticizes such formulas and shows that they are either untrue or circular. Either self-realization means realizing the _right_ part of the self or it is not always right. Promoting the “common good” either means bringing about those satisfactions which moral reason judges _ought_ to be brought about (e. g., those which are _just_ or of a _higher_ value) or it is not always right. And so a truer moral philosophy releases us from the false dogmatisms which may, though usually they do not, corrupt our practise.... “On the other hand, members of my class actually approached me, as if I were a father-confessor, for the solution of special problems in conduct!” In the following quotation from the same Journal, a different view is expressed. The author believes that ethics is sometimes concerned with the practical problems of conduct, but admits that this inclusion of practical interests results in some ambiguity and confusion.