These early philosophers looked only to the Aristotelian material cause for the origin and cause of things; yet reflection plunged them deeper into a consideration of the nature of being and relationships. The other causes were evoked by Anaxagoras and then by Plato, and by them were led into the arena of debate; and philosophers discussed the efficient and final cause as well as the material. Such discussions are recognized by Plato, and finally by Aristotle as relating to the first principles of cognition and being, and so as constituting metaphysics. The constant search for a deeper consistency of explanation had led on and on through a manifold consideration of those palpable relationships which make up the visible world; it had disclosed the series of necessary assumptions required by those visible relationships; and thus the search for causality and origins, and essential relationships, became one and the same--metaphysics. Metaphysics was not ineptly called so, since it had in time come after the cruder physical hypotheses. But such was not the order of _mediaeval_ intellectual progress. The Middle Ages passed through no preliminary course of physical hypotheses, explanatory of the universe. Not physics, but logic (introduced by grammar) led up to the final construction--or rather adoption and reconstruction--of ultimate hypotheses as to God and man, led up to the all-ordering and all-compassing _Theologia_. _Metalogics_, rather than Metaphysics, would be the proper name for these final expressions or actualizations of the mediaeval impulse to know. CHAPTER XXXVI TWELFTH-CENTURY SCHOLASTICISM I. THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS: ABAELARD. II. THE MYSTIC STRAIN: HUGO AND BERNARD. III. THE LATER DECADES: BERNARD SILVESTRIS; GILBERT DE LA PORRÉE; WILLIAM OF CONCHES; JOHN OF SALISBURY, AND ALANUS OF LILLE. I