The medieval Inquisition: A study in religious persecutionGorham, Charles T. (Charles Turner)
History
The medieval Inquisition: A study in religious persecution
Gorham, Charles T. (Charles Turner)
Inquisition
The following specimen of De Maistre’s reasoning will probably be
sufficient: “God has spoken; it is for us to believe. The religion which
he established is one, even as He is Himself. Truth being essentially
intolerant, to profess religious toleration is to profess scepticism; in
other words, to exclude faith. Woe, a thousand times woe, to the stupid
imprudence which accuses us of damning men. It is only God who damns; He
alone has said to His messengers: _Go, teach all nations! He that
believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned_”
(p. 72). This passage is reproduced merely as a curious example of the
religious reasoning of a century ago. Fortunately for human happiness,
the world has condemned this point of view by abandoning it. The day has
gone by for arguments which seek to justify religious persecution, and
for appeals to supernatural authority in support of irrational dogmas.
In our own time the Inquisition has found a far more reasonable and
fair-minded apologist in the person of Monseigneur Celestin Douais,
Bishop of Beauvais, who published in 1906 a scholarly examination of the
Holy Office. The first sentence of this work is that “The Inquisition
was established by the Papacy, which alone was qualified to do so,” and
that “this fact is universally known and recognized.” The Bishop adds
that the Inquisitor Eymerich expressly lays it down that an Inquisitor
is not a secular judge, but a delegate appointed by the Pope. If, in his
calm and restrained historical exposition, he nowhere condemns the
organized barbarity of the system, he freely exposes its defects, and
only incidentally defends its proceedings. He is a historian rather than
an apologist. The few considerations he urges are of quite minor
importance; if they extenuate the guilt of the Inquisitorial practice,
they by no means disprove the enormous mischief it produced. Thus he
asserts, on the authority of Eymerich, that the names of witnesses were
suppressed because, if mortal enmity to the accused could be proved
against them, they were required to withdraw from the case. In practice
the accused gained no advantage from this provision, for he could only
guess at his possible enemy, and the Inquisitors were ingenious enough,
if they so desired, to prove his guesses wrong. The handicap to the
prisoner remained, and it is possible to assume that one reason for the
extreme secrecy was the determination to render the concession useless.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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