“It can hardly be maintained that Japan aims her vast preparations at the United States; at least, not primarily. The pending Hawaiian affair has given rise to some irritation, but its importance has been systematically exaggerated by the English press. It cannot, in any event, go beyond the stage of diplomatic exchanges. Japan will, doubtless, receive from the United States sufficient assurance that the rights of her subjects in Hawaii will be protected in case of annexation, and thus far she has asked no more than that. She is certainly entitled to no less. “The object of the English in encouraging Japan to make a bold front against the United States was and is, like all their objects, purely commercial. They hoped to stir up in the Japanese mind an ill-feeling that would prevent the award of any more contracts to American shipyards, and even this characteristic stratagem is not likely to have more than a temporary effect. Thus I think it may be assumed that Japan’s immense naval preparation is not made with the United States in hostile view; certainly not mainly. “Assuming these conditions to be beyond dispute, and considering that the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway will at once make Russia a great Pacific power, politically and commercially, her naval situation in those seas must become a matter of prime importance; perhaps not of equal importance with that of the United States now, but at once sufficient to challenge the best efforts of her statesmen. “Having all these facts in view, and being in a position to judge with some accuracy of the significance and value of preparations which came under my own observation during a recent tour of Europe in my professional capacity, I could not help remarking the vast difference between the naval activity of Japan and that of the other two first-rate pacific powers, Russia and the United States. The existing situation in Russia and the United States, relatively speaking, can hardly be called more than the merest perfunctory progress, whereas the activity of Japan is really marvellous. If she were simply meditating another attack on China alone or unsupported, no such fleet as Japan is now building would be needed; certainly not the enormous battleships and the great armored cruisers. It must therefore be assumed that Japan’s purpose is the general one of predominant sea power in the Orient.