The Memoirs of François René Vicomte de Chateaubriand sometime Ambassador to England. volume 3 (of 6): Mémoires d'outre-tombe volume 3Chateaubriand, François-René, vicomte de
History
The Memoirs of François René Vicomte de Chateaubriand sometime Ambassador to England. volume 3 (of 6): Mémoires d'outre-tombe volume 3
Chateaubriand, François-René, vicomte de
Chateaubriand, François-René, vicomte de, 1768-1848
This resolution, desperate in appearance, was very reasonable at bottom
and offered not the smallest danger. I shall always remain convinced
that, had Bonaparte found Paris hostile and the King present, he
would not have tried to force them. Without artillery, provisions,
or money, he had with him only troops collected at random, still
wavering, astonished at their sudden change of cockade, at their oaths
taken headlong on the roads: they would promptly have become divided.
A few hours' delay and Napoleon was lost; it but needed a little
heart. Already, even, we could rely on a portion of the army; the two
Swiss regiments were keeping their faith: did not Marshal Gouvion
Saint-Cyr make the Orleans garrison resume the white cockade two days
after Bonaparte's entry into Paris? From Marseilles to Bordeaux, all
recognised the King's authority during the whole month of March: at
Bordeaux, the troops were hesitating; they would have remained with
Madame la Duchesse d'Angoulême, if the news had come that the King was
at the Tuileries and that Paris was being defended. The provincial
towns would have imitated Paris. The loth Regiment of the line fought
very well under the Duc d'Angoulême; Masséna was proving himself crafty
and uncertain; at Lille, the garrison responded to Marshal Mortier's
stirring proclamation. If all those proofs of a possible fidelity took
place in spite of a flight, what would they not have been in the case
of a resistance?
Had my plan been adopted, the foreigners would not have ravaged France
afresh; our Princes would not have returned with the hostile armies;
the Legitimacy would have been saved through itself. One thing alone
would have to be feared after success: the too great confidence of the
Royalty in its strength, and, consequently, attempts upon the rights of
the nation.
Why did I arrive at a period in which I was so ill-placed? Why have I
been a Royalist against my instinct, at a time when a miserable race
of courtiers was unable either to hear or to understand me? Why was I
flung into that troop of mediocrities, who took me for a raver when I
spoke of courage, for a revolutionary when I spoke of liberty?
A fine question of defense, indeed! The King had no fear, and my plan
rather pleased him through a certain "Louis-Quatorzian" grandeur;
but other faces had lengthened. They packed up the Crown diamonds
(formerly purchased out of the privy-purse of the Sovereigns), leaving
thirty-three million crowns in the treasury and forty-two millions in
securities. Those sixty-five millions were the produce of taxation: why
was it not returned to the people, rather than left to tyranny!
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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