(10) "As he should and must." Euth. I see no alternative. Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man? Euth. Certainly. Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition? So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). (11) (11) "I accept it at any rate as mine." N.B.--in reference to this definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein}, which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented to. Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases? (12) (12) Or, "may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to his fancy?" See above, II. vii. 8. Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man (13) who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with which our dealings with one another must be conducted. (14) (13) Or, "he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who knows," etc. (14) Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud. {allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai}, translate "must be specifically conducted." Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought? (15) (15) "As they should and must." Obviously (he answered). Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly--is it not so? Certainly (he answered). Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in respect of human affairs? That would seem to follow (he replied). Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right? Without a doubt, (he answered). Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant? What the laws ordain (he answered). Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought? (16) (16) "What they should and must." Euth. I see no alternative. Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just? (17) (17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)-- A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is just and right. Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just. Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are righteous and just. B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound, cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.