I report this incident fully because the behavior of Jimmie was in marked contrast with the usual behavior of the monkeys. Selfishness seemed everywhere dominant, while clear indications of sympathetic emotions were rare indeed. The above is undoubtedly the best evidence of anything altruistic that I obtained. It is possible that Tiny's action was retaliatory, but although it is practically certain that either Gertie or Jimmie inflicted the wound on her finger, I of course cannot be sure that the spirit of revenge stirred her to punish Gertie so severely. Jimmie's part in the whole affair is, however, perfectly intelligible from our human point of view, and there seems no reason to doubt that he did experience something like a feeling of sympathy with his mate, coupled with a feeling of resentment or anger against Tiny. VI HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF IDEATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN MONKEYS AND APES It is my purpose in this section to indicate the relations of my work on monkeys and apes to that of other investigators. Although throughout the report I have used freely the psychological terms idea and ideation, it has been my aim to describe the behavior of my animals rather than to interpret it or speculate concerning its accompaniments. Certain acts I have designated as ideational simply because they seemed to exhibit the essential features of what we call ideational behavior in man. Further study may, and probably will, modify my opinion concerning this matter. It is of prime importance to analyze ideational behavior so that it may be accurately described and satisfactorily defined in terms of its distinguishing characteristics. I had hoped to be able to present a tentative analysis in this report, but the results of my efforts are so unsatisfactory that I do not feel justified in publishing them. The terms idea and ideation have been used to designate contents of consciousness which are primarily representative. Nowhere have I attempted to indicate different types or grades of ideational behavior and nowhere have I found it necessary to emphasize differences between image and idea. In general, the acts which I have called ideational have been highly adaptive, and the learning processes in connection with which they have appeared have differed strikingly from those of the selective sort in their abruptness of appearance. Extremely interesting and valuable definitions of ideation and discussions of the characteristics of different sorts of ideas in the light of original observations on monkeys have been presented by Thorndike (1901, pp. 1, 2; 1911, p. 174); Kinnaman (1902, p. 200); and Hobhouse (1915, p. 270). As these authors have contributed importantly to our knowledge of the behavior of monkeys, their discussions of the meaning of terms are especially valuable. Serviceable definitions are to be found, also, in Romanes (1900), Morgan (1906), Washburn (1908), and Holmes (1911). _Evidences of Ideation in Monkeys_