At the same time I must admit that in other passages Bentham seems no less explicitly to adopt Egoistic Hedonism as the method of ‘private Ethics,’ as distinct from legislation: and in his posthumous ‘Deontology’ the two principles appear to be reconciled by the doctrine, that it is always the individual’s true interest, even from a purely mundane point of view, to act in the manner most conducive to the general happiness. This latter proposition--which I regard as erroneous--is not, indeed, definitely put forward in any of the treatises published by Bentham in his lifetime, or completely prepared by him for publication: but it may be inferred from his common-place book that he held it (see his _Works_, vol. x. pp. 560, 561). FOOTNOTES: [71] As I have before said, the applicability of a method for determining right conduct relatively to an ultimate end--whether Happiness or Perfection--does not necessarily depend on the acceptance of the end as prescribed by reason: it only requires that it should be in some way adopted as ultimate and paramount. I have, however, confined my attention in this treatise to ends which are widely accepted as reasonable: and I shall afterwards endeavour to exhibit the self-evident practical axioms which appear to me to be implied in this acceptance. Cf. _post_, Book iii. chap. xiii. [72] The notion of ‘Self-realisation’ will be more conveniently examined in the following chapter: where I shall distinguish different interpretations of the term ‘Egoism,’ which I have taken to denote one of the three principal species of ethical method. [73] See Note at the end of the chapter. [74] See Note at the end of the chapter. [75] We shall have occasion to consider Mill’s argument on this point in a subsequent chapter. Cf. _post_, Book iii. chap. xiii. [76] It should be observed that neither Cumberland nor Shaftesbury uses the term “Good” (substantive) in a purely and exclusively hedonistic sense. But Shaftesbury uses it mainly in this sense: and Cumberland’s “Good” includes Happiness as well as Perfection. [77] See Dissertation II. _Of the Nature of Virtue_ appended to the _Analogy_. It may be interesting to notice a gradual change in Butler’s view on this important point. In the first of his Sermons on Human Nature, published some years before the _Analogy_, he does not notice, any more than Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, any possible want of harmony between Conscience and Benevolence. A note to Sermon XII., however, seems to indicate a stage of transition between the view of the first Sermon and the view of the Dissertation. CHAPTER VII EGOISM AND SELF-LOVE