results, however, were not found satisfactory: and by degrees the attempt to exhibit morality as a body of scientific truth fell into discredit, and the disposition to dwell on the emotional side of the moral consciousness became prevalent. But when ethical discussion thus passed over into psychological analysis and classification, the conception of the objectivity of duty, on which the authority of moral sentiment depends, fell gradually out of view: for example, we find Hutcheson asking why the moral sense should not vary in different human beings, as the palate does, without dreaming that there is any peril to morality in admitting such variations as legitimate. When, however, the new doctrine was endorsed by the dreaded name of Hume, its dangerous nature, and the need of bringing again into prominence the cognitive element of moral consciousness, were clearly seen: and this work was undertaken as a part of the general philosophic protest of the Scottish School against the Empiricism that had culminated in Hume. But this school claimed as its characteristic merit that it met Empiricism on its own ground, and showed among the facts of psychological experience which the Empiricist professed to observe, the assumptions which he repudiated. And thus in Ethics it was led rather to expound and reaffirm the morality of Common Sense, than to offer any profounder principles which could not be so easily supported by an appeal to common experience. FOOTNOTES: [85] I use the term “dictates” to include the view afterwards mentioned (§ 2) in which the ultimately valid moral imperatives are conceived as relating to particular acts. [86] I have explained in the concluding paragraph of chap. iii. that a different view of hedonistic systems is admissible. [87] The wider of the two meanings of ‘Intuition’ here distinguished is required in treating of Philosophical Intuitionism. See Book iii. chap. xiii. [88] It must, however, be remembered that Aristotle regarded the general proposition obtained by induction as really more certain (and in a higher sense knowledge) than the particulars through which the mind is led up to it. [89] Strictly speaking, the attributes of truth and falsehood only belong formally to Rules when they are changed from the imperative mood (“Do _X_”) into the indicative (“_X_ ought to be done”). [90] It should be observed that such principles will not necessarily be “intuitional” in the narrower sense that excludes consequences; but only in the wider sense as being self-evident principles relating to ‘what ought to be.’ CHAPTER IX GOOD