corresponding to our past affection. And on these points there does
not seem to be agreement among moral and refined persons. For, on the
one hand, it is natural to us to admire fidelity in friendship and
stability of affections, and we commonly regard these as most important
excellences of character: and so it seems strange if we are not to aim
at these as at all other excellences, as none more naturally stir us to
imitation. And hence many would be prepared to lay down that we ought
not to withdraw affection once given, unless the friend behaves ill:
while some would say that even in this case we ought not to break the
friendship unless the crime is very great. Yet, on the other hand, we
feel that such affection as is produced by deliberate effort of will is
but a poor substitute for that which springs spontaneously, and most
refined persons would reject such a boon: while, again, to conceal the
change of feeling seems insincere and hypocritical.
But as for services, a refined person would not accept such from a
former friend who no longer loves him: unless in extreme need, when
any kind of tie is, as it were, invigorated by the already strong
claim which common humanity gives each man upon all others. Perhaps,
therefore, there cannot be a duty to offer such services in any case,
when the need is not extreme. Though this inference is not quite clear:
for in relations of affection we often praise one party for offering
what we rather blame the other for accepting. But it seems that
delicate questions of this kind are more naturally referred to canons
of good taste and refined feeling than of morality proper: or at least
only included in the scope of morality in so far as we have a general
duty to cultivate good taste and refinement of feeling, like other
excellences.
On the whole, then, we may say that the chief difficulties in
determining the moral obligations of friendship arise (1) from the
indefiniteness of the tacit understanding implied in the relation,
and (2) from the disagreement which we find as to the extent to which
Fidelity is a positive duty. It may be observed that the latter
difficulty is especially prominent in respect of those intimacies
between persons of different sex which precede and prepare the way for
marriage.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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