In the first place, it seems obviously needful to limit the extent of
its application. For it involves the negative principle that no one
should be coerced for his own good alone; but no one would gravely
argue that this ought to be applied to the case of children, or of
idiots, or insane persons. But if so, can we know _a priori_ that it
ought to be applied to all sane adults? since the above-mentioned
exceptions are commonly justified on the ground that children, etc.,
will manifestly be better off if they are forced to do and abstain
as others think best for them; and it is, at least, not intuitively
certain that the same argument does not apply to the majority of
mankind in the present state of their intellectual progress. Indeed,
it is often conceded by the advocates of this principle that it does
not hold even in respect of adults in a low state of civilisation. But
if so, what criterion can be given for its application, except that it
must be applied wherever human beings are sufficiently intelligent to
provide for themselves better than others would provide for them? and
thus the principle would present itself not as absolute, but merely a
subordinate application of the wider principle of aiming at the general
happiness or well-being of mankind.
But, again, the term Freedom is ambiguous. If we interpret it strictly,
as meaning Freedom of Action alone, the principle seems to allow any
amount of mutual annoyance except constraint. But obviously no one
would be satisfied with such Freedom as this. If, however, we include
in the idea absence of pain and annoyance inflicted by others, it
becomes at once evident that we cannot prohibit all such annoyances
without restraining freedom of action to a degree that would be
intolerable; since there is scarcely any gratification of a man’s
natural impulses which may not cause some annoyance to others. Hence
in distinguishing the mutual annoyances that ought to be allowed from
those that must be prohibited we seem forced to balance the evils of
constraint against pain and loss of a different kind: while if we admit
the Utilitarian criterion so far, it is difficult to maintain that
annoyance to individuals is never to be permitted in order to attain
any positive good result, but only to prevent more serious annoyance.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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