administration of Law the obligation of paying compensation for wrong
may sometimes be treated as a sufficient punishment for the wrongdoer.
When, however, we turn again to the other branch of Retributive
Justice, which is concerned with the reward of services, we
find another notion, which I will call Fitness, often blended
indistinguishably[222] with the notion of Desert, and so needing to be
carefully separated from it; and when the distinction has been made, we
see that the two are liable to come into collision. I do not feel sure
that the principle of ‘distribution according to Fitness’ is found,
strictly speaking, in the analysis of the ordinary notion of Justice:
but it certainly enters into our common conception of the ideal or
perfectly rational order of society, as regards the distribution both
of instruments and functions, and (to some extent at least) of other
sources of happiness. We certainly think it reasonable that instruments
should be given to those who can use them best, and functions allotted
to those who are most competent to perform them: but these may not
be those who have rendered most services in the past. And again, we
think it reasonable that particular material means of enjoyment should
fall to the lot of those who are susceptible of the respective kinds
of pleasure; as no one would think of allotting pictures to a blind
man, or rare wines to one who had no taste: hence we should probably
think it fitting that artists should have larger shares than mechanics
in the social distribution of wealth, though they may be by no means
more deserving. Thus the notions of Desert and Fitness appear at least
occasionally conflicting; but perhaps, as I have suggested, Fitness
should rather be regarded as a utilitarian principle of distribution,
inevitably limiting the realisation of what is abstractly just, than
as a part of the interpretation of Justice proper: and it is with the
latter that we are at present concerned. At any rate it is the Requital
of Desert that constitutes the chief element of Ideal Justice, in so
far as this imports something more than mere Equality and Impartiality.
Let us then examine more closely wherein Desert consists; and we will
begin with Good Desert or Merit, as being of the most fundamental and
permanent importance; for we may hope that crime and its punishment
will decrease and gradually disappear as the world improves, but the
right or best distribution of the means of wellbeing is an object that
we must always be striving to realise.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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