[62] I think that in most cases when a man yields to temptation, judging that it is “no use trying to resist,” he judges in semi-conscious self-sophistication, due to the influence of appetite or passion disturbing the process of reasoning. I do not doubt that this self-sophistication is likely to take a Determinist form in the mind of one who has adopted Determinism as a speculative opinion: but I see no reason for thinking that a Libertarian is not in equal danger of self-sophistication, though in his case it will take a different form. _E.g._ where a Determinist would reason “I certainly shall take my usual glass of brandy to-night, so there is no use resolving not to take it,” the Libertarian’s reasoning would be “I mean to leave off that brandy, but it will be just as easy to leave it off to-morrow as to-day; I will therefore have one more glass, and leave it off to-morrow.” [63] There is, however, a special case in which this probability may be indirectly a reason for not resolving to do what would otherwise be best; _i.e._ where this resolution would only be right if followed by subsequent resolutions. The problem thus presented is considered later, pp. 75, 76. [64] I should admit, indeed, that the ordinary notion of merit becomes inapplicable (see pp. 71, 72). But I do not see that Perfection becomes less an End to be aimed at, because we cease to regard its attainment as meritorious. The inapplicability of the notion of ‘merit’ to Divine action has never been felt to detract from the Perfection of the Divine Nature. [65] See Book ii. chap. v. and the concluding chapter of the treatise. [66] I ought, however, to point out that an important section of theologians who have held the belief in the moral government of the world in its intensest form have been Determinists. [67] In order to determine this we should require first to settle another disputed question, as to the general reasonableness of our expectation that the future will resemble the past. [68] See Book iii. chap. v. [69] Thus we find it necessary to punish negligence, when its effects were very grave, even when we cannot trace it to wilful disregard of duty; and to punish rebellion and assassination none the less although we know that they were prompted by a sincere desire to serve God or to benefit mankind.