The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'Âme et le CorpsBinet, Alfred
Philosophy
The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'Âme et le Corps
Binet, Alfred
Mind and body
The criticisms which have been directed against materialism are all,
or nearly all, variations of the principle of heterogeneity. We will
not dwell long on this, but simply recollect that, according to this
principle, it is impossible to attribute to the brain the capacity of
generating consciousness. Physical force can indeed generate physical
force under the same or a different form, and it thus produces all the
effects which are determined by the laws of nature. But it is
impossible to comprehend how physical force can enrich itself at a
given moment by a conscious force. Physical force is reduced to
movements of bodies and to displacements of atoms; how could a change
of position in any inert objects give rise to a judgment, a reasoning,
or any phenomenon of the consciousness? It is further said: this idea
of function, which materialists here introduce to render more
comprehensible the passage from a material body to a spiritual action,
contains only an empty explanation, for the function is not
essentially distinct by its nature from the organ; it is simply "the
organ in activity," it adds to the organ taken in a state of repose
but one change, viz. activity, that is to say movement, and,
consequently, the function of an organ is material by the same right
as the organ. When a muscle contracts, this contraction, which is the
proper function of the muscular fibre, consists in a condensation of
the muscular protoplasm, and this condensation is a material fact.
When a gland enters into activity, a certain quantity of liquid flows
into the channels of the gland, and this liquid is caused by a
physical and chemical modification of the cellular protoplasm; it is a
melting, or a liquefaction, which likewise is material. The function
of the nerve cell is to produce movement, or to preserve it, or to
direct it; ii is material like the cells. There is therefore nothing
in all those functional phenomena which might lead us to understand
how a material cause should be capable of engendering a conscious
effect.
It seems that all materialists have acknowledged that here is the
vulnerable point in their theory, for it is the principle of
heterogeneity which they have especially combated. But their defence
is wanting in frankness, and principally consists in subterfuges.
In brief, it affirms that we are surrounded with mystery, that we are
not sufficiently learned to have the right to impose limits to the
power of matter, and to say to it: "Thou shalt not produce this
phenomenon." A materialist theologian declares that he sees no
impossibility in stones thinking and arguing, if God, in His infinite
power, has decided to unite thought with brute matter. This argument
is not really serious; it demands the intervention of so powerful a
_Deus ex machina_, that it can be applied equally to all problems; to
solve all is to solve none.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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