The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'Âme et le CorpsBinet, Alfred
Philosophy
The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'Âme et le Corps
Binet, Alfred
Mind and body
Let us now place ourselves at the point of view of the consciousness.
We have supposed up to the present the suppression of the
consciousness, and have seen that we can still imagine the object
continuing to exist. Is the converse possible? Let us suppose that the
object is suppressed. Can the consciousness then continue to exist? On
this last point it seems that doubt is not possible, and we must
answer in the negative. A consciousness without an object, an empty
consciousness, in consequence, cannot be conceived; it would be a
zero--a pure nothingness; it could not manifest itself. We might
admit, in strictness, that such a consciousness might exist virtually
as a power which is not exercised, a reserve, a potentiality, or a
possibility of being; but we cannot comprehend that this power can
realise or actualize itself. There is therefore no actual
consciousness without an object.
The problem we have just raised, that of the separability of the
elements which compose an act of consciousness, is continued by
another problem--that of unconsciousness. It is almost the same
problem, for to ask one's self what becomes of a known thing when we
separate from it the consciousness which at first accompanied it, is
to ask one's self in what an unconscious phenomenon consists.
We have, till now, considered the two principal forms of
unconsciousness--that in nature and that in thought. The first named
unconsciousness does not generally bear that name, but is rather
discussed under the name of idealism and realism. Whatever be their
names, these two kinds of unconsciousness are conceivable, and the
more so that they both belong to physical nature.
If we allow ourselves to be guided by the concept of separability, we
shall now find that we have exhausted the whole series of possible
problems, for we have examined all the possible separations between
the consciousness and its objects; but if we use another concept, that
of unconsciousness, we can go further and propound a new problem: can
the consciousness become unconscious? But it is proper first to make a
few distinctions. It is the role of metaphysics to make
distinctions.[31]
Unconsciousness presupposes a death of the consciousness; but this
death has its degrees, and before complete extinction we may conceive
it to undergo many attenuations. There is, first, the diminution of
consciousness.
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