The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'Âme et le CorpsBinet, Alfred
Philosophy
The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'Âme et le Corps
Binet, Alfred
Mind and body
Conversely, introspection may, in certain cases, adopt the procedure
of externospection. No doubt it would be inexact to say that the
perception of one of our ideas always takes place through the same
mechanism as the perception of one of our sensations. To give an
account of what we think does not imply the same work as in the case
of what we see; for, generally, our thoughts and our images do not
appear to us spontaneously. They are first sought for by us, and are
only realised after having been wished for. We go from the vague to
the precise, from the confused to the clear; the direction of thought
precedes, then, its realisation in images; and the latter, being
expected, is necessarily comprehended when it is formed. But we may
come across curious circumstances in which it is the image which has
precedence over its appearance, and in that case it is exact to say
that this uninvoked image must be interpreted and recognised as if it
were an external object. In cases of this kind, there passes through
our mind something which surprises us. I see, by internal vision, a
face with a red nose, and I have to search my memory for a long time,
even for days, in order to give precision to the vague feeling that I
have seen it before, so as to finally say with confidence, "It is So
and So!" Or else I hear in my inner ear a certain voice, with a
metallic tone and authoritative inflections: this voice pronounces
scientific phrases, gives a series of lectures, but I know not to whom
it belongs, and it costs me a long effort to reach the interpretation:
it is the voice of M. Dastre! There is, then, a certain space of time,
more or less long, in which we can correctly assert that we are not
aware of what we are thinking; we are in the presence of a thought in
the same state of uncertainty as in that of an external, unknown, and
novel object. The labour of classification and of interpretation cast
upon us is of the same order; and, when this labour is effected
incorrectly, it may end in an illusion. Therefore illusions of
thought are quite as possible as illusions of the senses, though rarer
for the reasons above stated. But the question of frequency has no
theoretical importance.
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