The state of the country representation, and the system of the burgh government, would be in themselves sufficient to lay the ministerial party in the Athens open to suspicion, and to fill the rest of the inhabitants with discontent. But these are heightened by other circumstances. The judges, and more especially the crown lawyers, have a power over the people of Scotland, at which Englishmen would stand aghast. The judges (no matter whether they exercise it or not) have, directly or indirectly, the power of nominating every one of the jury by which a Scotchman is tried,--or, if they have not this power in its full extent now, they had it till very lately. In the case of ordinary crimes, this power, though a theoretical imperfection, might not be very dangerous in practice,--because, in ordinary crimes, there is nothing to entice a judge away from the natural dictates and natural course of justice; but, in offences of a political description, the case must be different,--because all or at least a majority of the judges, being persons who, at some period of their lives, are helped forward by ministerial influence, cannot be supposed to be entirely divested of those feelings of gratitude which are natural to all classes and conditions of men. The lord advocate of Scotland is, from the very nature of his office, much more a political character than any judge. In all questions between the King and his subjects, or between the people and the criminal law, he is not only the King’s principal officer, but the express representative of the King himself; and, except in the truly kingly and glorious attribute of granting pardon, he has more ample powers than the King has by the law of England. It is true, that, through the instrumentality of his attorney-general, the King can file warrants against such of his English subjects as are guilty of offences, tending to injure his person, or subvert his government, and bring them to trial without the intervention of a grand jury; and it is also true, that this power has been exercised in cases where neither the person nor the government of the King could have been in the smallest danger; but still, great as this power is in itself, and dangerous as the frequent exercise of it is to liberty, it is nothing in comparison of what the Scotch lord advocate possesses. The attorney-general is always understood to institute his proceedings in consequence of a representation from the sovereign himself, or from the great officers of the state; and, by law, it is strictly confined to what are called state offences. The lord advocate, on the other hand, is, of his own pleasure, and without necessary consultation with any one, not only the public prosecutor in all cases of trial, but the arbiter who decides who shall or shall not be tried; and, in the latter capacity, he, of the plenitude of his own power, performs all the functions of an English grand jury. When a crime, either