A capital defect at once declared itself in the two principal compositions, in the working gear of the superposed powers and in the balance of the motor powers.--In the first place, the hold given to the central government on its local subordinates was evidently too feeble; with no right to appoint these, it could not select them as it pleased, according to the requirements of the service. Department, district, canton, and commune administrators, civil and criminal judges, assessors, appraisers, and collectors of taxes, officers of the national-guard and even of the gendarmerie, police-commissioners, and other agents who had to enforce laws on the spot, were nearly all recruited elsewhere: either in popular assemblies or provided ready-made by elected bodies.[2101] They were for it merely borrowed instruments; thus originating, they escaped its control; it could not make them work as it wanted them to work. On most occasions they would shirk their duties; at other times, on receiving orders, they would stand inert; or, again, they would act outside of or beyond their special function, either going too far or acting in a contrary sense; never did they act with moderation and precision, with coherence and consequence. For this reason any desire of the government to do its job proved unsuccessful. Its legal subordinates--incapable, timid, lukewarm, unmanageable, or even hostile--obeyed badly, did not obey at all, or willfully disobeyed. The blade of the executive instrument, loose in the handle, glanced or broke off when the thrust had to be made.