Truly, as Professor Höffding says, "the difficulty is greater than Mr. Mill imagined." The difficulty is great enough to undermine the whole basis upon which welfare is defined as "a state of continuous pleasurable feeling." If, as Professor Höffding declares, welfare is to be interpreted as activity, work, development; if this kind of active welfare is the greatest good, whatever admixture of pain and whatever absence of pleasurable feeling it may have; if the greatest amount of a state of continuous pleasurable feeling is not welfare in an ethical sense, what becomes of the utilitarian definition of welfare as pleasurable feeling? If, however, welfare is "the state of a continuous pleasurable feeling," how can we declare that the life of a pessimistic philosopher is preferable to that of a joyful fool? Must not the ultimate reason of this conflict be sought in Professor Höffding's statement that— "The proposition of a purpose presupposes in the subject which makes the proposition feelings of pleasure and displeasure." (P. 30.) Should we not rather say that the proposition of a purpose presupposes an expression of _will_ in the subject which makes the proposition? Wherever there is will, there is also approval and disapproval, but approval is not always pleasurable and disapproval is not always attended with displeasure. Does it not often happen that we cannot help disapproving of things which please us? We have mainly limited our review to some topics of the first division entitled "The Conditions of Ethics," because we have regarded them as most important in a representation of the ethical principles. The doubts we have raised as to the consistency of the author are less noticeable in the remaining chapters, which contain an unusual store of ideas presented with great lucidity. The doctrine of the freedom of will is excellently treated (chap. v.). Social ethics, family life, marriage, the position of woman, and the education of children are separately and exhaustively discussed, and there is no chapter which even if we cannot always give assent to the author's views, does not richly repay a careful perusal. P. C. KURZGEFASSTE LOGIK UND PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Dr. K. Kroman_. Translated from the second edition of the Original by F. Bendixen. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland. Dr. Kroman is professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. He has sought to present in this book of three hundred and eighty nine pages the elements of Logic and Psychology. The work was principally intended for the use of the general reader and the beginner, although its author hopes it will not be altogether without interest to the specialist, and that it will find its way into the schools of pedagogy (the subject of the art of education being also incidentally dealt with in its pages).