The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Besides Feelings, we have Sensations of reaction; as when a person
blindfold suddenly runs against a post, when we make a muscular
effort, or when any feeling gives way to a new feeling. Suppose I had
nothing in my mind but a feeling of blue, which were suddenly to give
place to a feeling of red; then, at the instant of transition there
would be a shock, a sense of reaction, my blue life being transmuted
into red life. If I were further endowed with a memory, that sense
would continue for some time, and there would also be a peculiar
feeling or sentiment connected with it. This last feeling might
endure (conceivably I mean) after the memory of the occurrence and
the feelings of blue and red had passed away. But the _sensation_ of
reaction cannot exist except in the actual presence of the two feelings
blue and red to which it relates. Wherever we have two feelings and pay
attention to a relation between them of whatever kind, there is the
sensation of which I am speaking. But the sense of action and reaction
has two types: it may either be a perception of relation between two
ideas, or it may be a sense of action and reaction between feeling and
something out of feeling. And this sense of external reaction again
has two forms; for it is either a sense of something happening to us,
by no act of ours, we being passive in the matter, or it is a sense of
resistance, that is, of our expending feeling upon something without.
The sense of reaction is thus a sense of connection or comparison
between feelings, either, _A_, between one feeling and another, or _B_,
between feeling and its absence or lower degree; and under _B_ we have,
First, the sense of the access of feeling, and Second, the sense of
remission of feeling.
Very different both from feelings and from reaction-sensations or
disturbances of feeling are general conceptions. When we think, we are
conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general
rule, we are aware of being governed by a habit. Intellectual power is
nothing but facility in taking habits and in following them in cases
essentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the
normal cases of connections of feelings under which those habits were
formed.
The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in a
tendency to generalisation. Feeling tends to spread; connections
between feelings awaken feelings; neighboring feelings become
assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so many
formulations of the one law of the growth of mind. When a disturbance
of feeling takes place, we have a consciousness of gain, the gain of
experience; and a new disturbance will be apt to assimilate itself
to the one that preceded it. Feelings, by being excited, become more
easily excited, especially in the ways in which they have previously
been excited. The consciousness of such a habit constitutes a general
conception.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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