The objection to this conception of things is made by a consistent idealist, that these observations must always exist in some mind, they do not exist outside of a mind, and mind can as little go beyond itself as a person can walk outside of his skin. Certainly, observations always exist in some mind; they have always a subjective element. But they have also an objective element. No sensation, no perception, no observation is without an objective feature. This objective feature in a sensation or a perception, and also in an abstract idea, is the element that if true has to agree with other facts outside of the sentient being of whose mind the perception is a part. An idealist who is pleased to deny this would either have to identify hallucinations with sensations, or he would be obliged to consider the objective elements of his mind merely and solely as subjective states, having no representative value. In that case he would necessarily be obliged to consider the facts represented, i. e. the things outside the body, as parts of his mind. This being granted, every mind would appear as congruent and coextensive with the universe. We should have as many universes as there are minds, and yet all universes would be only one and the same universe, their sole difference being that of a difference of centres. With the death of every living creature a universe would die; but notwithstanding the chain of consciousness were broken forever in death, the existence of his mind, being that which is commonly considered as the objective universe, would not cease; merely a view-centre would be lost. That which we have characterised as representations in feeling-substance (which according to our terminology constitutes mind) would be a transient and unessential feature of mind only; and if it should cease to be, mind would still exist in what we have defined as the outside facts, the facts represented in mental symbols. In short, mind would be the All, it would be a synonym of God. And not only all mental beings actually existing or having existed would each, one and all, constitute the universe, but also all potential minds, every atom and all possible combinations of atoms that possibly might play a part in the mental activity of a sentient being, would constitute it. The views of an idealist who accepts these consequences are undeniably correct, although we may quarrel about the propriety of his terminology. Yet an idealist of this type, we may fairly assume, will have little difficulty in adapting himself to our terminology, and in that case we might easily agree about the possibility of arriving at a criterion of truth; for his world-conception (aside from a difference in terms) might, or rather would be practically the same as ours.