The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
This condition of things, the obstinacy, the timidity with which state
and public opinion hold fast to religion,—and now in times of imminent
social danger more so than ever,—must be borne in mind if we wish
to understand the comparatively great success that the philosophy of
Schopenhauer and Hartmann has had in Germany. In the support of these
two systems the philosophical opposition of freethought has simply
found expression—the opposition that has arisen against the official
philosophy, of which it cannot exactly be said that it theologises, but
which carefully avoids coming into conflict with theology, and does
not, in its aristocratic academic exclusion, endeavor to influence more
extended circles. The factor that made this philosophy of opposition
accord with the spirit of the times—its proximity, namely, to the
scientific world-theory—has already been emphasised; and the fact
that its pessimistic coloring has not been changed by its connection
therewith will be found intelligible when we consider the turn that
pessimism took in the hands of Hartmann. Only the quietistic Buddhism
that Schopenhauer taught, could, in an age of the highest expansion and
display of power both at home and abroad, appear as an incomprehensible
riddle of the national mind. The evolutionistic pessimism of Hartmann,
however, which demands of the individual complete and resigned
submission to the struggle for existence, although it is able to
offer him in the remotest background of time no better outlook than
the ultimate annihilation of existence itself—is in its immediate
practical commands too closely akin to an optimistic conception not
to satisfy fully the needs of life, and is again too analogous to
certain cosmological prophecies of natural science not to pass as the
metaphysical expression of a truth otherwise accredited.
As opposed to this state of things Neo-Kantianism or the Critical
Philosophy in its various forms has taken no firm position; no more
than its master Kant himself did. To a great extent it makes use of the
limitations of knowledge that have been critically determined, in order
to leave open behind the same a realm of transcendent possibilities
in which religion may lead a passably secured existence. Behind the
greatest critical acumen theological prejudice is only too often
concealed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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