The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Man being, however, what he is, informed by a mind, prone to error,
and he, in consequence, frequently subjected to evils and misses that
better information would have enabled him to avoid or mitigate, he
naturally seeks to solve the causes of his errors, and to discover
means of testing the worth of his thoughts and of deriving thoughts
that are true and competent. This search is the study of logic; the
true information relevant thereto is logic, and no other device of
man ought to trespass upon the name. Using for this turn the word
truth in a broader sense than usual, so as to include the sense of
competence, we may say that Logic is the Science of Truth and Untruth
in Thought,—take notice, _in thought_—for we are supposing that there
neither is, nor can be, any other or further _means_ of becoming aware
of aught of the nature or features, of aught that is pure alternate to
mind, than thought merely, and that, therefore, truth and untruth in
thought exhausts all the proper possibilities of truth and untruth.
Following Hegel, and concurring with so many others, our author
starts with Being as the proper primordial universal notion. Is this
not taking note merely of the comprehensive meaning of thought, in
ignorance of its denominate meaning? Prior, at least logically, to
Being, Form, Mode, Limit, Relation, and the like, must there not
be posited or supposed somewhat to _be_, to _be formed_, to _be
modulated_, to _be limited_, to _be related_, etc? Must not Quality
be quality _of_ somewhat, and Quantity, quantity _of_ somewhat? So it
seems to us and we therefore posit Ground as primordial in thought.
Ground as intended here is not the same as the Absolute Being of Hegel.
It is in general independent of the notions either of existence or
reality, being in general that of which aught is predicative either
in discourse or thought. It is pure logical denomination free of all
logical comprehension. The imaginary number and the ideal number of
mathematics are each just as truly grounds according to this intent as
is a house or a tree.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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