The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
On searching for the reason why such various experiences are expressed
by the use of one word, Mr. Fullerton discovers that the common notion
which unites them is the idea of similarity. But how can we speak of
similarity when strictly only one thing is in question? The answer
given is that we have "a series of experiences, beginning with one in
which two objects are recognised as similar and yet are very clearly
distinguished as two objects, continued in others in which the sense
of duality falls more and more into the background, and ending in one
in which there is no consciousness of duality at all." The last of
these experiences is not wholly different from the others. It differs
from them "not in the element which has led us to declare two objects
similar—the element which they have in common—but in that which has
led us to declare them two and different. It is by adding to this last
experience, so to speak, that we get the others. They contain it and
more." The experience in which two things are not distinguished, is
at the bottom of all our experiences of similarity. The use of the
expression "X is X," then, emphasises the fact that one is not to
pass from X to any Y or Z, and it, moreover, puts a period to one's
thinking, and fixes the thought upon X alone. When the words "identity"
and "sameness" are intended to be used with some degree of precision,
the former word indicates "sameness in which there is no consciousness
of duality, or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into
the background and may easily be overlooked."
More than half of Mr. Fullerton's work is occupied by an historical and
critical consideration of the use of the word _same_ in a wrong sense,
beginning with Heraclitus and coming down to Prof. W. K. Clifford.
The examples he has given of that confusion of thought justifies the
assertion of "the need of much greater care and exactitude than one
commonly finds in metaphysical reasonings," and at the same time the
hair-splitting for which Mr. Fullerton needlessly considers himself
called on to plead guilty.
Ω.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. WITH OTHER ESSAYS. By _Constance C. W. Naden_.
Edited by R. Lewins, M. D. London: Bickers & Son.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account