We have not space to critically consider Miss Naden's essay on "Evolutionary Ethics," which is a valuable study in Sociology. She gives logical form to Mr. Herbert Spencer's quasi-utilitarian system in the words, "the _inclination_ is always in the direction most pleasurable or least painful; the _results_ of the action, if it be a moral one, are such as in the long run and on a large scale, must increase happiness; but the _object_ of the action need not be connected in the mind of the actor with any thought of happiness, personal or general." The practical objection to this view of moral conduct is the reference to _personal_ happiness. This should be excluded altogether as an actual motive of such conduct where self is the chief object concerned. Here duty or virtue should be the guiding principle, as it should be ultimately in all moral conduct. This indeed is really admitted when it is said that rational utilitarianism "aims, not straight at happiness, but at the essential conditions of happiness." The weak point in Mr. Spencer's system of ethics is the origin it assigns for the altruistic sentiment. This is based in sympathy, the germ of which, says our author, is to be found in the fact that the ideal or "representative" world possesses an emotional aspect and therefore "the thought of a fellow creature carries with it the thought of his feelings." This thought is not necessarily, however, accompanied with an active feeling of sympathy. It requires some other influence to give it external expression, and this must be sought in the activity of the sexual instinct. Traced to this source we can understand how the altruistic sentiment may become instinctive, giving rise through parental and fraternal affection, to the higher love of country and of race, which in time will also become instinctive. In taking leave of Miss Naden's work, we must say that, much as we disagree with its Hylo-Idealistic views, it deserves to be read by all who are interested in the search for the key to the great problem of nature. Its examination of the logical system of Kant is slight, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the name of the great German philosopher is omitted from among the precursors of Darwin. Miss Naden is in error, too, in describing Haeckel as a pronounced Materialist. He is no more so than was Darwin himself. Such mistakes were probably due to the bent of the mind of our authoress, whose too early death is a loss to the cause of truth and to humanity itself. Ω. EMBLEMATIC MOUNDS AND ANIMAL EFFIGIES. By _Stephen D. Peet_. Chicago: American Antiquarian office.