The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
In the same way, every one who learns to play an instrument will first
feel that part only which his hand touches. By and by, however, he
will acquire a consciousness of the effects produced by the slightest
touch. Constant practice forms in the brain of an expert certain living
structures which are correspondent to the action of the instrument
and represent it with great accuracy. Whenever these structures are
stimulated, the action of the instrument is felt to take place. In
this way consciousness is projected into the work performed by the
instrument. The touch of the hand has become purely automatic, and
the operator now feels the full effects of his manipulation although
he is not in direct contact with all the parts of his instrument.
The instrument becomes as if alive under his treatment, he feels it
as a part of himself; for its action stands _en rapport_ with his
brain-activity.
* * * * *
#The subject-superstition and agnosticism.#
States of consciousness, collectively considered, have been termed
"subject," and we have also employed the phrase "subjective world." But
we must not forget the fact, that the adoption of the name "subject"
is based upon a misconception. Subject means "that which underlies,"
and the subject was supposed to be that something which formed the
basis of all the states of consciousness present in any one special
case—in you or in me, or in any person like you and me. The subject
was considered as a being that was in possession of sense-impressions,
of feelings, of thoughts, of intentions, etc.; and the existence of
this subject was proved by Descartes's famous syllogism _Cogito ergo
sum_. The subject was supposed to produce the states of consciousness,
while in fact (as we have explained above) it is exactly the opposite.
Feelings change into mind, they produce the subject which thinks. The
subject is nothing underlying but rather overlying. It is the growth
out of and upon feelings. It is the sum of many feelings in a state of
organisation.
The fallacy of Descartes's dictum has been pointed out by Kant. The
existence of states of consciousness, or the fact _cogito_, does
not prove the existence of something that underlies the states of
consciousness. It simply proves the existence of feelings and thoughts.
There are certain sense-impressions, there are perceptions, there
are ideas. Ideas develop from perceptions, and perceptions develop
from sense-impressions. States of consciousness are nothing but the
awareness or the feeling that is connected with certain perceptions and
ideas.
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