The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Idealist philosophers are apt to say that the subject alone is known
to us, while the existence of the object must forever remain a vague
hypothesis. This, however, is incorrect. It involves an unjustifiable
deprecation of the objective element in the given facts of conscious
states, and is based on a misconception of the entire state of
things. The data of knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are
relations between subject and object. Neither the subject is given,
nor the object; but an interaction between subject and object. From
this interaction we derive by a very complicated process of abstraction
both concepts, the subject as well as the object. It is true that the
subjective world of feelings and of representative feeling is very
different from the objective world of things. Nevertheless they are
one. The subject together with all objects forms one inseparable whole
of subject-object-ness.
Every special object, accordingly, must be conceived as a part of
this inseparable whole—of the All; it is a certain set of facts,
represented in a certain group of experiences, and is to be described
as that something which in a special way affects the subject and can
again in a special way be reacted upon by the subject.
#Idealism and realism.#
Here we have the clue for the proper meaning of objectivity. What is a
piece of lead but something that at a definite distance from the centre
of the earth exerts a certain pressure proportionate to its mass; that
is seen to become liquid at a certain temperature; etc., etc.? If it
is treated in a particular way, it will be observed to suffer certain
changes. What lead is has been established by experience; i. e., by
systematic observation through sense-impressions.
From this standpoint the differences between the schools of idealism
and realism appear as antiquated. The questions whether matter is real,
whether objects exist, and whether there is any reality at all, have
lost their meaning. That which produces effects upon the subject and
against which the subject does or can react, is called object. The
sense-effects produced by the object upon the subject, and also the
reactions of the subject upon the object, are realities; and every name
of a special object signifies a certain group of such effects and their
respective reactions. Thus, for instance, the word lead comprises a
certain set of experiences that have always been found combined with
certain whitish objects.
#Space and Reality.#
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