The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Mr. Spencer compares our apprehension of space-relations to our inherited
habit to grasp with our hands and to walk with our feet. This comparison
is misleading and inappropriate. That we grasp with our hands and walk
with our feet is incidental. There are animals who have developed other
limbs for the same purposes. There are monkeys who grasp with their
tails and the elephant grasps with his nose. There is no necessity and
no universality in our predisposition of grasping with our hands. Yet
there resides necessity and universality in the laws of formal thought
so that wherever animals develop rational thought we are sure that to
them twice two will always equal four just as much as it does to us.
However they may be different in other respects: they may be winged
creatures or may be somewhat like our ants, they may have developed other
bodily structures than we can dream of, nevertheless their arithmetic,
their logic, and their mathematics will in all essentials be exactly the
same as ours. There are animals whose thought-forms are not as highly
developed as in man, but there are no animals in whom they are developed
differently. We must consider it as impossible even that on other stars
rational creatures can be found whose reason differs from ours. To them
also twice two will be four.
II. THE PROBLEM OF APRIORITY.
Kant did not call the formal laws _a priori_ in order to characterise
them as innate ideas, but simply to denote that their validity is
necessary and universal. If I have to walk twice a distance of two miles,
I know “beforehand” (i. e. _a priori_) that I shall have to walk four
miles—even before I have made the actual experience. And this wonderful
quality of giving information beforehand is characteristic of all the
laws of formal thought. It is certain that our ability of applying the
laws of formal thought has been acquired by experience in the race as
well as in the individual. But their necessity has to do with experience
in so far only as its recognition is the indispensable condition of all
methodical experience—i. e. of science. The laws of formal thought and
our recognition of their necessity and universality (alias, “apriority”)
are the organ of any and all scientific cognition. The methods of the
sciences are exact measuring and counting based upon the faith that the
laws of measuring and counting are unalterable and unfailingly reliable.
We know beforehand that they will hold good for all possible cases.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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