The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
all the consequences of his mistake, he conceded freely that we are not
justified in assuming that twice two will always be four: many thousands
of experiences are in its favor, but we cannot be at all sure that no
case will ever happen in which twice two makes five.
The ideas of causality and of the conservation of matter and energy are
not derived from experience in the narrow sense of the word, not from
sense-experience, but from experience in the wider sense of the word, i.
e. from sense-experience arranged with the assistance of formal laws. We
should not forget that mere sense-experience exists only in our abstract
thought. In reality all sense-experience is relational, it is inseparable
from its form. Form and the laws of form are not something purely mental
which is transferred to the world of reality, form is something real, it
is objective, it is a quality of the facts and the thought-forms of mind
are a part and a product of the formal structure of the universe.
The ideas of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy are
not prior to experience, they are a part of experience, i. e. experience
in the wider sense. They are not part of the sense-experience, but the
results of our experiments with purely formal thought-operations, and
being the vital instrument or organ of cognition they are the condition
of all methodical experience.
IV. WHY IS MR. MILL’S PROPOSITION UNTENABLE?
In practical life we all expect that 2 × 2 will under all circumstances
make 4, and not 5. We reject Mr. Mill’s idea that there may be even a
possibility of the latter. Is our expectancy really due to _a posteriori_
experience which having been repeated so often in the lives of our
ancestors is now so firmly rooted in our minds that we imagine it to
be necessary and _a priori_? No! certainly not. The experiences of our
race in the struggle for life has produced our ability of thought,
but it has nothing to do with the apriority of the products of formal
thought-operations. A statement of formal thought such as “twice two
makes four,” cannot be compared to statements of sense-experience such
as that sugar has a sweet taste. There may be a moment in which the
taste of sugar will be bitter to our tongue. This is quite possible.
But to say that twice two might in the future or in any other world, as
Mr. Mill maintains, make five is nonsensical, and the possibility of
this assumption cannot be placed in one line with the possibilities of
extraordinary and exceptional sense-experiences.
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