The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
germ of consciousness somehow associated with the protoplasmic material
of which that ovum is constituted. How comes it that, in the adult dog,
consciousness is associated with the brain? Why is the association of
consciousness concentrated, so to speak, in this one tissue of the
many which arise during the differentiation of development? That the
association is so concentrated or specialised is now generally admitted
to be the fact. We speak indeed of the skin, the palate, the nose, the
eye, the ear, as each in its kind sensitive. But none the less we believe
that the seat of consciousness is the brain or some part of it. Only
when the nerves running inwards from skin, palate, nose, eye, or ear,
have conveyed their appropriate stimuli to the brain, does that organ
tingle with the accompaniment of consciousness. There and there only
does consciousness “emerge”; not in peripheral sense-organ or ingoing
nerve. But why? How comes it that there is this peculiar association of
consciousness with the functioning of a particular organ?
Perhaps we are told that consciousness is the special product of
brain-tissue. But let us note that the word “product” is here used in
an unwonted sense. We are not likely, it is to be hoped, to fall into
the crude and demonstrably false materialism expressed in the formula,
“as the liver secretes bile, so does the brain secrete consciousness.”
Consciousness being immaterial, the second and fourth terms are
incommensurable, and the formula is sheer nonsense. Nor are we likely
(though here there is greater danger) to fall into the more subtle error
of regarding consciousness as a mode of energy. “Granted,” says Professor
Tyndall, “that a definite thought and a definite molecular action of the
brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor
apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass by
a process of reasoning from the one to the other: the chasm between the
two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable.”
Consciousness is something _sui generis_. It is neither matter nor
energy. It may accompany the transformations of energy in the dog’s
brain; but to the category of these transformations of energy it does
not, and, for any clear thinker, can not belong. And if we are told that
the word “product” is used in the sense implied by Professor Huxley when
he speaks of phenomena of consciousness being “called into existence” by
physical processes; then we must again ask whence they are called into
existence. We do not now speak of matter or energy being called into
existence from a shadowy nowhere. When a cloud is called into existence
on a mountain peak we know that the material particles have only assumed
a new form. When the electrical current is called into existence or
generated as we phrase it, we know that we are dealing with one of the
many transformations of energy. And when phenomena of consciousness
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