The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
“Scepticism has been vigorously advancing in the nation—I
might say, in Europe. And not only has it extended its sphere,
but it includes within that sphere some of the loftiest and
profoundest intellects of the age—men renowned for vast and
exact erudition, for scientific research or critical acumen.
Philosophers, poets, historians, novelists, openly or silently
disavow Christianity. In palaces, in lordly mansions, in
college halls, in secluded homesteads, and here and there in
rectory or vicarage, scepticism, if it has not a bold and
fearless utterance, at least expresses itself in a guarded
whisper. It becomes doubly a duty, then, when notwithstanding
the general diffusion of avowed or latent unbelief, we trace
everywhere the presence of a conservatism that conceals and
hesitates and trembles at the doubts which it cannot suppress,
that individual dissentients should candidly disclose their
theological divergences. Christianity, indeed, which has had
its triumphs in the past, will long conserve a portion of
its power, and continue to furnish guidance not only for the
unreasoning multitude, but for thousands of excellent men and
women who cannot abandon the old religious ideal. But there is
no final arrest for the intellectual progress of mankind.”
We now turn to Mr. Call’s work on “Final Causes.” In an introductory
chapter of eight pages he compresses the history of the doctrine of
Design in nature from Anaxagoras, B. C. 500, to our own time, stating
its modifications, criticisms, denials. In the second chapter a brief
account is given of “Natural Theology,” whose modern form is found to
rest fundamentally on Newton’s generalisation, that a body at rest
continues at rest unless acted upon by some external force; and on the
geometrical order of planetary revolutions. Starting anew from this point
the human mind has discovered in the varied realms of nature apparent
evidences of a supersensuous Intelligence. Kant, however, is brought
to criticise Newton. “Kant notes with delight that the ‘harmonical
relations which excite the feelings in a more sublime manner than even
the contingent beauties of nature originate in the properties of space’;
and this inevitable congruity he refers ultimately, indeed, to Divine
Wisdom, but directly to a common dependence on a single sovereign
ground, to a unity of possibilities which it is no more difficult to
conceive as self-existent than it is to conceive an Intelligent Cause as
self-existent.” Matter is not, then, naturally inert, but an aggregate
of forms and forces, and nature a self-adjusting, self-evolving power.
In a chapter on “Order and General Adaptation” it is shown that nature
contains vast realms of Disorder; and alleged “special adaptations”
are shown too as often as otherwise for cruelty and agony. “With what
feelings,” asks G. H. Lewes, “can we contemplate the destruction of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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