The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
In the further progress of my physical work I soon discovered that it was
very necessary _sharply to distinguish_ between what we _see_ and what
we mentally _supply_. When, for example, I imagine heat as a substance
(a fluid) that passes from one body into another, I follow with ease
the phenomena of conduction and compensation. This idea led Black,
who established it, to the discovery of specific heat, of the latent
heat of fusion and vaporisation, and so forth. _This same_ idea of a
constant quantity of heat-substance _prevented_ on the other hand Black’s
successors from using their eyes. They no longer mark the fact which
every savage knows, that heat is _produced_ by friction. By the help of
his undulatory theory Huygens follows with ease the phenomena of the
reflexion and refraction of light. The same theory _prevents_ him, for he
thinks solely of the longitudinal waves with which he was familiar, from
marking the fact of polarisation which he himself discovered, but which
Newton on the other hand, undisturbed by theories, perceives at once.
The conception of fluids acting at a distance on conductors charged with
electricity facilitates our view of the behavior of the objects charged,
but it _stood in the way of_ the discovery of the specific inductive
capacity, which was reserved for the eye of Faraday undimmed by any
traditional theories.
Valuable therefore as the conceptions may be which we mentally
(theoretically) supply in our pursuit of facts, bringing to bear, as
they do, older, richer, more general, and more familiar experiences
on facts that stand alone, thus affording us a broader field of view,
nevertheless, the same conceptions may, as classical examples and our
own experience demonstrate, lead us astray. For a theory, indeed, always
puts in the place of a fact something _different_, something more
simple, which is qualified to represent it in some _certain_ aspect,
but for the very reason that it is different does _not_ represent it
in other aspects. When in the place of _light_ Huygens mentally put
the familiar phenomenon of _sound_, light itself appeared to him as a
thing that he knew, but with respect to polarisation, which sound-waves
lack, as a thing with which he was doubly unacquainted. Our theories are
abstractions, which, while they place in relief that which is important
for _certain fixed_ cases, neglect almost necessarily, or even disguise,
what is important for other cases. The law of refraction looks upon
rays of light as homogeneous straight lines, and that is sufficient
for the comprehension of the geometrical aspect of the matter. But the
propositions that relate to refraction will never lead us to the fact
that the rays of light are periodical, that they interfere. Just the
contrary, the favorite and familiar conception of a ray as a smooth
straight line will rather render this discovery difficult.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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