The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
It is the same with the well-known theory of projection. The problem of
the _physicist_ is, to seek the luminous object-point of a point imaged
on the retina of the eye in the backward prolonged ray passing through
the point of intersection of the eye. For the perceiving subject this
_problem_ does not exist, as the light-sensations of the retinal spots
are connected from the beginning with determinate space-sensations. The
entire theory of the psychological origin of the “external” world by the
projection of sensations outwards is founded in my opinion on a mistaken
transference of a _physically_ formulated inquiry into the province
of _psychology_. Our sensations of sight and touch are bound up with,
are connected with, various _different_ sensations of space, that is to
say these sensations have an existence _by the side of_ one another or
_outside of_ one another, exist in other words in a _spatial_ field,
in which our body fills but a part. That table is thus self-evidently
_outside of_ my body. A projection-problem does not present itself, is
neither consciously nor unconsciously solved.
A physicist (Mariotte) makes the discovery that a certain spot on the
retina is blind. He is accustomed to associating with every spatial
point an imaged point, and with every imaged point a sensation. Hence
the question arises, what do we see at the points that correspond to the
blind spots, and how is the gap in the image filled out? If the unfounded
influence of the physicist’s method of procedure on the discussion of
psychological questions be excluded, it will be found that no problem
exists at all here. We see _nothing_ at the blind spots, the gap in the
image is _not_ filled out. The gap, moreover, is not felt, for the reason
that a defect of light-sensation at a spot blind from the beginning can
no more be perceived as a gap in the image than the blindness say of the
skin of the back can be so perceived.
I have chosen intentionally simple and obvious examples, such as
render it clear what unnecessary confusion is caused by the careless
transference of a conception or mode of thought which is valid and
serviceable in one domain, into another.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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