The hypothesis that feelings can be felt, without being felt as my feelings, is a very noteworthy one. “A feeling at the instant when it _exists_, exists _an und für sich_, and not as my feeling.” This is why a Greek said δέδορκα in the sense of I see, because the act of perception is necessarily over, when we become conscious of it. “When,” continues Clifford, “I remember the feeling as _my_ feeling, there comes up not merely a faint repetition of the feeling, but inextricably connected with it a whole set of connections with the general stream of my consciousness.” This is very truly and acutely observed but it is an admission that the unrelated feeling is no element in our experience, that in our cosmos at least there is no ὕλη whatever, but that every corner of it is illumined by the presence of a relating self. _My_ consciousness never directly testifies at all to the existence of an absolute feeling. To be _my_ feeling a feeling must already be brought by connections of content into the web of my experience, but what do I know of feelings which are not mine. Are not “absolute feelings” an inference based on observation of low organisms like the amœba, which we are convinced have no self and yet feel? It should be also noticed that this supposition that we are not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious of our feelings ἔξεισιν εις ἄπειρον. Thus Clifford writes: “This memory (of a feeling which existed _an und für sich_ as _my_ feeling) is, _qua_ memory, relative to the past feeling, which it partially recalls; but in so far as it is itself a feeling, _it_ is absolute, _Ding an sich_.” That is to say, I am not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious even of what I remember. To be conscious of the content of a memory I must _remember_ that I remember it. Surely this new memory in turn cannot be known _ex post facto_ and so I must _remember_ that I remember that I remember _et sic ad infinitum_, before I become really _conscious_ of anything at all. One other point might be raised. What is the nature and origin of the laws which govern the sequence and coexistence of feelings. We have already seen that feelings as such neither follow nor coexist apart from a self.