The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
We should say, to state our opinion briefly, that space and time are not
“real existences,” i. e. they are not concrete objects, but they are real
nevertheless; they are not material things; not thingish realities, yet
they are objective properties of things. They are the forms of things
and processes, and belong to the things whether they become objects of
cognition or not. In this sense, they actually belong to the things in
themselves, viz. to the objective things.
Kant argues that space and time are not conceptions derived from outward
experience; they have not been abstracted from sense-impressions. They
are necessary representations _a priori_, they are not discursive ideas
or generalisations, for there is but one space and one time, space being
represented as infinite and time as eternal.
From these arguments Kant draws the conclusions that space and time do
not represent qualities of an object but that they are the form of all
sensory phenomena, space being the form of the external, time of the
internal sense. In other words, space and time belong to the subjective
condition of the sensibility and not to the objective world.
We answer that our conceptions of space and time are after all derived
from experience. Space and time are abstractions. There is no time in
itself. There is no space in itself. Space and time are not directly
derived from outward experience, nor are they derived from the
sense-elements of experience. Inner experience, i. e. reflection to the
exclusion of sense-impression, the experimenting with pure forms, will
lead to the construction of the concepts of space as well as of time.
Space and time, magnitudes and numbers having been constructed in the
mind of a thinking subject are applied to practical experience. When
counting three trees we do not abstract the number “three” from the three
trees, but we apply to them the system of numbers in our possession.
Says Kant:
“We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves
of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough
think that no objects are found in it. It must therefore be
considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena and
by no means as a determination dependent upon them and is a
representation _a priori_, which necessarily supplies the basis
for external phenomena.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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