Kant says, and in this we agree with Kant, that “all thought must directly by means of certain signs relate ultimately to _Anschauungen_.” The word _Anschauung_ (the “onlooking,” generally translated by “intuition”) means the immediate presence of sense-perception. Says Kant: “The effect of an object upon our faculty of representation is called sensation, and that intuition which refers to an object by means of sensation is called empirical intuition.” For instance, I see a rose: The image of the rose which I see is the appearance or the phenomenon. Kant continues: “That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I term its _matter_, but that which effects that the contents of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its _form_.” In other words matter is that which affects the senses and form is to be expressed in relations. The difference between the formal and the material is obvious. The formal is of great importance, nay, it is of paramount importance, but the formal is neither anything apart from the material nor is it a substance. Both concepts are disparate, but they have been derived by mental abstraction from the same reality. We fully agree with Kant when he continues: “That in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation.” But we do not agree with Kant when from this proposition he derives the following conclusion: “It is, then, the _matter_ of all phenomena that is given to us _a posteriori_; the _form_ must lie ready _a priori_ for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.” Here lies the great fallacy of Kant, which rests upon an erroneous statement and an actual distortion of fact. The phenomenon of a rose which I see before me is not merely sensory, but also formal. The phenomenon, i. e. the image of the rose (_die Anschauung_) is a sensation of a special form. The term sensation as it is generally used implies its having a special form. Accordingly the form does not, at least not from the beginning, lie ready _a priori_ in the mind; the form is given together with the sensation. Kant speaks of “that which is annexed to perception by the conceptions of understanding,” as if our understanding added the formal out of the mind to the sensory elements given by experience. What is the mind? The mind is a product of the world; it is a system of symbols representing the things of the world and their relations including such possible relations as are worthy of aspiring for. In short, the mind consists of ideas and ideals.[44]