The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
The ego is a Latin term used in philosophical language to denote the
pronoun “I,” and the pronoun “I” is quite a definite nerve-structure
situated in quite a definite place of the centre of language. As
all words, so also the term “I” is a symbol. Its general meaning is
unequivocal; it stands for the name of the speaker. It stands for Mr.
Brown, if Mr. Brown speaks of himself, for Mr. Smith, if Mr. Smith speaks
of himself, etc.
What does Mr. Brown mean when he says, “_I_ speak, _I_ act, _I_ will, _I_
feel pain, _I_ feel pleasure, _I_ intend,” etc.?
When Mr. Brown speaks, a certain number of word-structures in the
centre of language are in a state of commotion, innervating the muscles
of speech. Correspondent to this physiological process, a state of
consciousness obtains, which is an awareness of the situation. When
he adds: “I say this,” it is again a special nerve-structure that is
irritated into action and he might just as well say: “Mr. Brown says
this.” The idea of Mr. Brown, viz. of his own personality, is just as
much an idea as his idea of Mr. Smith. The main difference consists
in the fact that the idea of one’s own personality is very much more
important than the ideas representing other personalities.
The nervous structure representing the feeling of the idea “I” must be
the centre of innumerable nervous tracts connecting it with all those
activities which when performed are thought of as done by ourselves.
The “I do this” is almost constantly ready to fill the present state
of consciousness and to accompany any action performed through the
innervation of other brain structures.
Sentient substance is not always actually feeling. It is feeling only
when in a state of extra-commotion. Systems of sentient substance
are called organisms; all its structures are interconnected and most
so those structures in which sentiency as well as motory impulses
are differentiated—viz. the nervous structures. The extra-commotions
which agitate the different nervous structures, the memories of
former sense-perceptions, of sounds, of words, of ideas depend upon
the conditions of the moment. Now this and now another structure will
represent the summit of commotion and the feeling of the strongest
commotion at a given time will under normal conditions appear as the
contents of consciousness. It is as it were the focus in which the
attention of the whole organism is centralised. That which appears in
the focus is clear and distinct, while the other weaker feelings rapidly
disappear into the undistinguishable general feeling of the organism as a
whole, commonly called cœnæsthesis or _Gemeingefühl_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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