The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
The truth contained in this proposition may be expressed thus: When a
thing develops, some part of it remains the same during the change,
so that a continuity is preserved. Yet every change of a part of an
organism—such is the intimate interconnection of all its parts—produces
an alteration, be it ever so small, of the whole unity. And in the course
of evolution the character of the whole thing may be changed. Think of
the growth of a caterpillar into a butterfly, or of an egg-cell into a
man. However, the changes in the character of an adult man will become
slighter and slighter the stronger certain features of his existence
preserve their sameness, although the most stable personality will,
nevertheless, be subject to, at least, unimportant changes as long as
life lasts.
Mr. Conybeare, like his master Professor Green and all the
transcendentalists, is still under the influence of a belief in the
thing in itself. The unity of an organism which is the product of the
co-operation of its parts, is not some independent thing whose business
it is to gather up their single activities and bring them into relation
with one another. The unity of a self is the combination of all those
relations which make of its parts a systematised whole, and this unity
is changing together with its constituents; as a matter of fact, we have
to state that it does _not_ remain constant or the same with itself.
Mark that I do not deny the unity of the soul, nor do I underrate the
enormous importance of this unity. But I do deny that this unity exists
independent of its parts. It is as much immanent in its parts as is a
melody in its notes. There is as little a transcendental self-hood as a
melody in itself independent of its sounds.
The assumption of a transcendental unity which throughout the process
of evolution remains the same with itself naturally leads to a wrong
conception of what Mr. Conybeare calls “latent capacities.” The terms
potential existence and latent qualities are fertile and useful ideas but
we must beware not to employ them incorrectly. Any heap of iron ore can
be called a potential sword. This is a mode of speaking which expresses
the possibility that the ore can be changed somehow into a sword. But the
sword does not exist at all, not even as a latent quality of the ore.
The ore has no latent qualities of that kind. Those qualities of the ore
which represent the potential sword are very patent to everybody who
knows the art of using them properly and changing them into an actual
sword.
We may say that the hen’s egg contains a potential chick; but this is a
mere mode of speech devised to say that the egg can be changed into a
chick under certain conditions. There is no chick at all contained in the
egg and nothing that is like a chick.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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