The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Science has not merely a theoretic value, its aim and purpose consist
in its application to practical life. Science is throughout ethical.
Thus ethics has also its mythological phase. In agreement with Professor
Mach (p. 204), we should find it ridiculous if one who presumes to be an
ethical teacher of mankind would say:
“Man _must_ not be descended from monkeys,” “The earth _shall_
not rotate,” “Matter _ought_ not everywhere to fill space,”
“Energy _must_ be constant,” and so on.
Why is it ridiculous? Because we cannot prescribe a certain deportment to
facts. It is however not ridiculous to let a precise and carefully sifted
knowledge of facts determine our own deportment.
Science has to teach ethics. But here also we should distinguish between
positive facts and mythology. Ethics based upon mere theories, upon
our interpretations of nature which we add to facts, is mythological;
positive ethics is simply that deportment which is suggested by a
comprehension of the facts themselves.
Mythological ethics may be quite correct, just as much so as the
application of a mythological theory of science may be within certain
limits reliable as a working hypothesis. But it is desirable to
understand the nature of mythological ethics in order to distinguish
between truth and fiction.
When Professor Mach speaks of sensations as being the elements of the
world and of things as being complexes of these elements he apparently
does not use the word sensation in its usual sense. It has ceased to be
an abstract term which represents one feature only of a process of nature
and has become a symbol for an entire reality. And is not such a usage of
terms as if they were not abstracts but the things themselves liable to
lead to misconceptions?
Professor Mach’s “elements,” it seems to me, are only elements, i.
e. ultimate and unanalysable materials, if considered as terms of a
psychological view of the world; they are not elements in the domains of
other abstractions, such as are made by physiology or physics. Moreover,
although this method eliminates the duality of soul and body, mind and
matter, feeling and motion, it does not explain the problem.
Professor Mach might answer that the problem as to the duality of mind
and matter is a sham problem, just as much as the problem why do we
see things upright when the retina picture of the eye shows the things
inverted? But a problem is to him who has solved the problem always a
sham problem. Every problem disappears as a problem as soon as it is
solved. It is true that we see as little with the blind spot of the eye
as with the skin of our back. The problem of the blind spot is not why
do we not see with the blind spot, (which is simply a matter of fact,)
but why do we not notice, when using only one eye, its lack of sight
in a spot surrounded with sight-seeing structures? We have to employ
artificial means to convince ourselves that we are really blind in that
spot!
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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