[13] That ants communicate with each other through their antennæ is an undeniable fact. But Landois believes that they communicate also through sounds. Some ants possess in their stridulation-organ a kind of a rattle the sound of which, however, is perceptible to the human ear only in the Ponera ants. [14] See _Three Lectures on the Science of Language_, p. 47. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago. [15] Prof. Lloyd Morgan introduces several new terms, which seem well coined. The mental product which is called the object of sense he calls “construct”; the most prominent feature in a composite sense-image, he calls the “predominant”; and if the predominant is named and isolated by abstraction he calls it an “isolate.” [16] An impartial criticism of Professor Romanes’s position has been made by Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his recent work _Animal Life and Intelligence_. [17] This quotation is requoted from Prof. Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 325. [18] _The origin of Mind_, in _The Monist_, Vol. I. No. I. [19] L. c., p. 281. “So much about the subject or the monon. What now about the objects or the mona?” [20] Prof. Max Müller is a great admirer of Kant and so am I. But it appears to me that we differ greatly in what we accept as the essential teachings of the master; and I grant willingly that Prof. Max Müller has preserved the doctrines of Kant more faithfully than I. I have attempted to modernise Kant. If I am called a Kantian (and I do not object to the name, on the contrary I am proud of it) it is because I proceed from Kant and I attempt to preserve the spirit of Kant’s philosophy rather than his doctrines. For the sake of the spirit of Kantian philosophy I have seen myself urged to surrender the idea of the thing-in-itself as something unknowable. Prof. Max Müller has preserved in his philosophy (for such is the _Science of Thought_) the Ding-an-sich theory. Believing in things-in-themselves he must consistently believe in a self or monon, for this monon is nothing but the thing-in-itself of the soul. I have limited myself in the present article to the principle of continuity in evolution as a point of divergence between Prof. Max Müller and the views defended by _The Monist_. If I attempted at present to enter into the philosophical problem of things-in-themselves, I should be obliged to tax too much the patience of my readers. But as I am convinced that the reason of our difference with Prof. Max Müller concerning the continuity of evolution lies deeper still, I intend to treat the subject of things-in-themselves in a future number. LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE I. FRANCE.—THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING OF THE LANGUE D’OC.