The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
The same objection cannot be made if we remain conscious of the fact that
feelings are as much abstracts as motions. Subjectivity and objectivity
are correlative terms. There is as little a duality in the idea, that
subjects presuppose objects as that effects presuppose causes. There
are not causes in the world which are nothing but causes, nor are there
effects which are nothing but effects. Take for instance an historical
event. Was Cæsar’s death a cause or an effect? Plainly, this depends upon
the view we take. As the sequence of the wounds which Cæsar received
from his assassins it was an effect; as the beginning of the civil war
consequent thereupon it was a cause. If I look at you, you are the object
and I am the subject. If you look at me, it is the reverse. Thus the
relation of a certain thing to its surroundings makes of it a subject,
while the surroundings are its objects.
Subject and object being correlatives, we can very well understand why
there are no “subjects in themselves”; every subject is at the same time
an object in the objective world. We can further understand, why every
subjectivity except our own withdraws itself from direct observation.
We can observe the movements of organisms like ourselves and judge by
way of analogy that they feel pain or enjoy pleasure. We see their
motions which betray certain feelings, but we can never see the feelings
themselves; and even supposing that we could enter into the brain of a
man and that the whole mechanism of brain-action were laid open to our
inspection in its minutest details, we should see motions, combinations
and separations, integrations and disintegrations, we should see the
oxydation of the gray substance, which would appear as a great turmoil
and excitement, but we should see (as Leibnitz says) no thoughts, no
perceptions, no feelings. That it cannot be otherwise is obvious when
we consider that our objects will always present to us the character of
objectivity.
But suppose We were an atom of oxygen and entered into the process of
brain-action as an active factor, our subjectivity would soon become
absorbed and welded into a higher unity with the subjectivity of the
other atoms. We should then, as a part of that brain’s consciousness,
feel these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts; we should, then, _be_ the
subject which we could not see and which we were searching for in vain in
the world of objectivity.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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