The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Form being given, we can reason about the form of existence in general.
We can have ready in our minds systems of pure forms to apply to all the
various cases of our experience. And this will help us in unravelling
the problems of reality, and in extending our knowledge in those fields
with which we are little acquainted. Far be it from us to consider the
definitions, the operations, and the results of the formal sciences
as purely verbal; if they were, mathematics would lose all the great
importance which it undeniably possesses, and become mere verbiage.
I confess that I do not understand Mr. Dixon when he says: “It is only
because our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments
are necessary at all.” In my opinion all mental activity is symbolic.
Every idea is a symbol that signifies something. It is not because our
reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments are necessary
at all, but symbolism is the nature of our mind, and symbols are the
elements with which our reasoning faculties have to deal. In this sense,
every argument is symbolic. If it symbolises sense-experience, it
represents our knowledge of what may be called the materiality of things.
If it symbolises operations with pure forms, it represents the purely
formal relations of mathematics logic, algebra, etc.
The doctrine of the conservation of matter and energy in reality means
nothing more or less than that there is no increase or decrease in the
world at large. Nothing originates out of, and nothing disappears into,
nothing. It means that twice 1 + 1 is 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, neither more nor
less; or, in other words, it means that all events are transformations.
New things originate, but their newness consists in their forms. In this
sense the law of the conservation of matter and energy would have to
be called, from Mr. Dixon’s standpoint, other differences neglected, a
truism. It is not a truism, in the sense of being arbitrary, but in the
sense of being a purely formal truth, as are all mathematical theorems.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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