The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
But among these shadows there can be no efficient causation. When a
change takes place in the sense-compelling _universe_, the mighty
machine will cast one shadow before the change and another after. The
second shadow will accordingly succeed the first in orderly sequence,
but the relation between the shadows is not the relation of cause and
effect. Accordingly, in the laws of Nature which have been discovered
by scientific investigation, we find abundant instances of unfailingly
concomitant events and of uniformities of sequence, but not one single
instance of cause and effect. There is nothing competent to cause one
body to exclude another from the space it occupies. A statement of
the fact is one of the laws of Nature. If a stone be allowed to drop
in the vicinity of the earth, its downward speed is accelerated by a
perfectly definite law. This law is one of the Uniformities of Nature
which scientific inquiry has brought to light. But within the domain of
Physics there is no cause of acceleration. The facts as to what occurs in
Nature can be observed; the circumstances under which they occur can be
investigated; similar cases can be compared; and the laws to which the
simultaneous or successive events conform may be brought to light. But
here our knowledge ends. Physical science has said its utmost.
Now all this is changed when we turn to the only field of observation
accessible to us in which we are dealing directly with _auta_. The
_thoughts_ of which _I_ consist, the thoughts which are my _mind_, are
_auta_; a very small group of _auta_, no doubt, in the mighty _Universe_,
but still an actual sample, though a very special and one-sided sample
of what _auta_ really are. Now in the operations that go on in my mind I
do find instances, some few instances, of causes producing effects. The
familiar case of a geometrical demonstration producing in a man’s mind
a belief in the truth of the conclusion is a case in point. Here the
understanding of the proof is the efficient cause of the belief in the
conclusion which accompanies that understanding. A wish to accomplish
something, and a knowledge of how to go about it, both of which are
_thoughts_ in the _mind_, are a part of the efficient cause of subsequent
events, unless counteracted by other causes. A few other examples can be
obtained from the same small field of observation; and this is all that
man, in his isolated position, has any right to expect; for the bulk of
his thoughts are due, at least in large part, to autic causes which lie
outside his mind, and it is there also that those of his thoughts that
are known to be causes, usually exhibit their effects. When perceptions
arise in my mind, the effect indeed is within my mind, but the cause is
beyond it; and when I move my muscles the cause is within my mind, but it
is outside the mind that it operates. The instances are indeed few where
the causes and the effects are both within my tiny group of _auta_, and
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